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KEY POINTS 
• There are deficiencies in the Parliamentary oversight of the ‘roll-over’ of pre-existing trade agreements; 
the Government should address these as a matter of urgency.
• For future trade agreements, the provisions of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 ( 
CRAG Act) are insufficient. The influence of the UK Parliament on the treaty ratification processes should 
be at least equivalent to that currently enjoyed by the European Parliament and other EU Member State 
legislatures, with a remit for devolved administrations. 
• The UK should establish formal mechanisms for a wide range of stakeholders to feed into the process of 
trade negotiation. 
• In addition, the UK should undertake Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) of new trade agreements. 
Certain key features should be adopted from the EU’s approach, including the use of independent 
consultants, an emphasis on stakeholder and public engagement and ex-post evaluation. 
• The SIA process could play a greater role in shaping negotiation outcomes. Providing a role for 
parliamentary committees would introduce greater transparency and accountability into the UK’s trade 
policy.
• Through the roll-over of EU trade agreements, the UK will inherit the EU’s approach to trade and 
sustainable development.  Implementing EU sustainable development chapters will require the UK 
government to replicate an array of advisory bodies currently managed by the EU. 
• The UK’s degree of future regulatory alignment with the EU remains uncertain at the time of writing. 
If it prioritises access to new markets over continued levels of access to the EU, this underscores 
the importance of identifying and responding to the impacts of new Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) on 
environmental and consumer protection standards.
• Effectively addressing procedural and substantive elements of sustainable development through trade 
negotiations will result in trade policy that is more informed, more democratically legitimate, and benefits 
more of Britain.
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We conclude that the UK’s ability to take leadership 
in this area will hinge around its ability to develop 
a robust framework to ensure that the negotiation 
process is transparent and democratically 
accountable, and that the impact of new trade 
agreements – including on the environment and 
vulnerable populations – is assessed and addressed. 
Doing so will allow the UK to negotiate based upon 
a more solidly grounded position regarding impacts 
on a range of stakeholders, such that its trade 
agreements benefit more of the UK, and are less 
likely to be undermined by public protest. UK trade 
agreements will be both an influential component of 
UK foreign policy, and also a significant determinant 
of its domestic economy and regulation. The UK has 
outlined its ambition for ‘Green Brexit’, in its twenty-
five year environmental plan (HM Government, 2018), 
acted as a global leader on climate change mitigation 
through its Climate Change Act 2008, Clean Growth 
Strategy and Fifth Carbon Budget, and committed 
to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (2015). 
Its trade strategy should harmonise with its policy 
ambitions in other areas as well. For these reasons 
we believe that the set of issues we address here are 
not auxiliary concerns but rather integral to UK trade 
policy.
PROCEDURAL DIMENSIONS: 
‘TRANSPARENT AND INCLUSIVE TRADE’
The UK has committed to ‘transparent and inclusive’ 
trade, stating that ‘Parliament, the devolved 
administrations, the devolved legislatures, local 
government, business, trade unions, civil society, and 
the public from every part of the UK must have the 
opportunity to engage with and contribute to our trade 
policy’ (HM Government, 2017). There are significant 
gaps in identifying, and formalising, the role that 
these actors will play in UK trade policy. To undertake 
transparent and inclusive trade policy, the UK 
Government will actively need to reform the approach 
to Parliamentary involvement and stakeholder 
consultation; it will need to fill gaps in some cases 
and go beyond its current proposals in others. 
A) Existing trade agreements
The Government has declared its intention to 
establish UK trade agreements that are based as 
closely as possible on those that partners have signed 
with the EU (UK Parliament, 2017, para. 38). This has 
been described informally as ‘rolling over’, and the 
process is governed by the proposed Trade Bill, which 
is currently being debated. The Trade Bill grants the 
UK Government the ability to implement the non-tariff 
aspects of rolled-over trade agreements (Trade Bill, 
B) Future trade agreements
Parliamentary scrutiny
The Trade Bill does not say anything about negotiating 
future trade agreements, and it remains unclear 
what role the Parliament and the devolved nations 
will have in their negotiation and ratification. This is 
concerning, as the default legislation applying to UK 
trade negotiations is the 2010 Constitutional Reform 
and Governance Act (CRAG Act). While it provides that 
the Commons can block treaty ratification indefinitely, 
Parliament’s powers are limited: it does not have 
to vote on, or even debate, ratification of treaties. 
(CRAG Act, Chapter 2, Part 2) The CRAG Act provides 
Parliament a more limited influence than, for example, 
the European Parliament, which has to provide or 
decline assent to the final trade agreement, must be 
kept informed during the negotiation process and can 
state its positions and make recommendations at any 
time (European Parliament, 2015). Trade agreements 
that include provisions on portfolio investment and 
Investor State Dispute Settlement also must be 
ratified by individual EU Member States’ Parliaments 
(Court of Justice of the European Union, 2017). 
The reinforcement of parliamentary sovereignty is 
often cited as one of the main benefits of Brexit. 
For this reason, the UK Parliament’s oversight of, 
and influence on, UK trade policy should at least be 
commensurate to that enjoyed by parliaments under 
EU law. Nor does the EU Parliament have an unusually 
large degree of influence on trade negotiations in 
an international context; in the US, for example, the 
Congress has greater authority over whether trade 
negotiations can be authorised, and also must vote on 
whether to accept the final agreement. 
UK trade agreements will impact upon many areas of 
the UK economy in which Parliament has legislative 
powers, such as energy, public services, agriculture 
and finance. Parliament should have an enhanced 
role in trade negotiation, including a specific remit for 
devolved administrations, enabling influence in setting 
the mandate for negotiations and reviewing their 
progress, as well as voting on whether to ratify the 
final Agreement. 
Public information and consultation mechanisms in 
trade negotiations
As the UK government determines which new trade 
agreements will be beneficial for the UK, it is essential 
that it strengthens and clarifies its negotiating strategy 
by soliciting information from both businesses and 
civil society regarding their offensive and defensive 
interests in the agreement. UK industry already 
consults domestically on its priorities for EU trade 
Clause 2(1)). 
While the term ‘roll-over’ suggests automaticity, 
as Gasoriek and Holmes have argued, this is not 
the case. Among other issues, partner countries 
can require that EU agreements be reopened for 
negotiation with an independent UK (Gasoriek and 
Holmes, 2017).  The powers granted to the UK 
government under the Trade Bill, controversially, 
are broadly conceived: they apply even if trade 
agreements change from those agreed under the EU. 
The Trade Bill grants the government what are known 
as ‘Henry VIII powers’ to enable changes to primary 
legislation retained under EU law without normal 
parliamentary scrutiny. Hestermeyer concludes that 
this could impact upon EU labour and environmental 
laws inter alia and that the resulting agreements 
should be subject to detailed parliamentary scrutiny, 
including a final vote on whether to accept or reject 
them (Hestermeyer, 2018, at 10, 22). 
We recognise that, from a pragmatic perspective, 
Parliament may find such a task overwhelming given 
the number of trade agreements at stake and the 
competition from other Brexit-related legislation. 
Even barring a full parliamentary vote, however, the 
Government must provide for some scrutiny and 
oversight of its approach to the trade agreements 
which will, at least initially, constitute its external 
trade regime, and which may be subject to substantial 
modifications from their current forms. One approach 
would be to utilise Parliamentary Select Committees 
to perform this function. 
As has been noted by the International Trade 
Parliamentary Select Committee (ITC), there has 
been to date little transparency regarding the rollover 
process, such that the strategy, timeline and process 
by which the UK Government is negotiating with EU 
trade partners remains unclear. The ITC has made the 
sensible suggestion that the Government produce a 
‘risk register’ detailing which Agreements take priority 
and outlining contingency plans in case a partner 
country change its mind about simply replicating an 
agreement (ITC report, p. 15).
Another consideration is that the implementation 
of these agreements, notably their chapters on 
sustainable development, environmental and labour 
standards, will not be seamless; it will require the UK 
Government to establish advisory bodies and develop 
other governance mechanisms. This challenge is 
not unique to trade; it is relevant across the entire 
spectrum of issues that are currently subject to EU 
regulation. We discuss this in more detail below. 
INTRODUCTION
Leaving the EU Customs Union will necessitate the 
UK having an independent trade policy.1 As part of 
the process of governing its external trade, the UK 
must consider how it will integrate its sustainable 
development objectives into this policy. In this 
briefing paper, we conceive such objectives broadly, 
including transparency, political participation and 
access and consultation, as well as obligations within 
FTAs to uphold labour standards and environmental 
protections. Among developed countries, in particular, 
commitments in all these areas have increasingly 
expanded and strengthened (see, eg, Berger, et al., 
2017). In the EU’s case, for example, the past decade 
has seen a greater role for the European Parliament 
in trade negotiations, a major initiative to increase 
transparency and the promotion of sustainable 
development from listed objective to the subject of 
dedicated chapters. This promotion has arisen in 
concert with ambitions to address a wider range of 
issues, including regulatory standards and approval 
processes, intellectual property and Investor State 
Dispute Settlement, through Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs). It also responds to public protest, and 
concerns about the potential competitive advantage 
that the EU’s FTA partners gain through low labour and 
environmental standards.
Here we consider potential approaches to (1) 
integrating sustainable development objectives into 
the negotiating process; and (2) reflecting these 
objectives through UK trade strategy. The intent 
is not to provide a comprehensive set of policy 
recommendations (though we do offer some), but 
rather to identify gaps which we believe require more 
discussion. These gaps are inextricable from the 
larger, and largely unresolved, question of how the UK 
will undertake the governance of its trade agreements. 
As the UK has not managed its external trade 
independently for many years, there are no existing 
procedures for scoping, negotiating and ratifying 
trade agreements. The UK government has indicated 
that more information is forthcoming (Fox, 2018) but 
the proposed Trade Bill provides no guidance vis-a-
vis future trade agreements, and sets a concerning 
precedent by not providing for Parliamentary oversight 
of the ‘roll-over’ of existing EU trade agreements. 
1, Even if it maintains a customs union with the EU, the UK will 
need to pursue agreements with the same trade partners in 
parallel, so many of the issues outlined in this Briefing still pertain. 
At the time of writing, the UK Government does not intend to 
negotiate a customs union with the EU after leaving, though it is 
possible that a cross-party rebellion on the Trade and Customs Bills 
will lead to a change in its position. 
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SIAs have been found to have only a limited impact on 
trade negotiations (Kirkpatrick, 2006). The following 
proposals form the basis of a new UK scheme for 
SIA that best serves the UK’s trade policy, taking into 
account the weaknesses that have been identified in 
the EU’s framework. 
i) Process
As the main proponent of the trade agreement, the 
Government would have an obvious conflict of interest 
in the SIA’s findings being positive. As in the EU, UK 
SIA should, therefore, be conducted by independent 
consultants chosen through a competitive process. 
Due to the relatively small number of companies that 
are active in this area, and their desire to attract 
future contracts, questions can be raised over whether 
the consultants will be completely independent. 
Nevertheless, the use of an external party should 
still be considered preferable to the Government 
assessing an FTA’s potential impacts. Consideration 
could be given to there being an oversight role for 
either the ITC or another independent body. This would 
not completely address the concerns raised here, 
but it would add an additional level of scrutiny to the 
selection process.
Like the EU, the UK should develop an overarching 
framework for SIA, setting out its core principles and 
certain basic requirements, but consultants should 
be required to develop bespoke methodologies and 
consultation plans that best suit the agreement being 
negotiated. This would ensure that SIAs both meet 
the needs of the UK’s negotiators and are directly 
relevant to the agreement in question. It would not be 
necessary for every SIA to cover every issue. If an FTA 
is solely concerned with improving access to financial 
services, for example, there would be no need to 
assess its impacts on fisheries.
Equally, UK SIA should also consider a broad range 
of environmental, social, economic and human rights 
impacts, but these should reflect the UK’s own 
national and international development priorities. 
There are certain factors not considered in the EU 
that the UK may wish to include, for example, whether 
a trade agreement could lead to regulatory reform 
in the UK and the impacts the agreement may have 
on different regions within the UK. How different 
issues are categorised should be consistent across 
all SIAs to facilitate comparisons of different trade 
agreements.
It is essential that mechanisms are put in place 
to enable dialogue between stakeholders and 
consultants, and consultants and the negotiators, and 
the wider public should also be given opportunities 
to feed into the process. A dedicated SIA website, 
agreements (Henig, 2018, p 3). However, a recent 
report from the London School of Economics (LSE) and 
the British Chamber of Commerce concludes that the 
UK’s current approach to stakeholder engagement is 
insufficient to guarantee that the government will have 
access to the scope and quality of information it will 
need to inform a trade negotiation. The report notes 
that stakeholder engagement has been ad hoc, non-
transparent and focused on large businesses (LSE and 
BCC, 2018). 
As it takes control of its trade policy, the UK must 
adopt a more formal and transparent approach 
to stakeholder engagement by establishing direct 
channels of influence into the negotiation process. 
In line with the LSE/BCC recommendation, as well 
as recent EU practice (European Commission, 2017), 
the UK should establish minimum standards of 
engagement for trade agreements, as well as formal 
bodies to facilitate this engagement. For example, 
an Advisory Group comprised of a wide variety of 
stakeholders, including civil society and small and 
medium enterprises, could feed in recommendations 
to the UK negotiating teams. The UK government 
must also address the need for public information, 
committing to making its negotiating objectives clear/
explicit, publishing draft negotiating chapters and 
providing readable, accessible explanatory documents 
in a timely manner.  
Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA)
The UK should pursue an evidence-based approach to 
trade policy in which the impacts of trade agreements 
are identified and addressed. It is in the UK’s interests 
to develop its own SIA framework for future trade 
agreements. Trade liberalisation often requires 
trade-offs between different sectors of the domestic 
economy. SIA is a mechanism that not only seeks 
to minimise the negative impacts of FTAs, but also 
to maximise their benefits. In short, a robust SIA 
framework will lead to better trade agreements.
EU SIA is conducted by independent consultants, 
which are selected through a competitive process. The 
Commission provides an overarching framework with 
which all SIAs must comply (EU Commission, 2016), 
but consultants are expected to devise a bespoke 
methodology relevant to the specific issues that 
will be negotiated. Consultants must also produce 
a consultation plan, which, inter alia, identifies key 
stakeholders that must be formally consulted, sets 
out the consultation methodologies and explains how 
other interested parties and the broader public can 
feed into the SIA. 
Whilst a useful foundation for the UK, EU SIAs have 
been criticised. There are flaws in the SIA process and 
on which all relevant information is made publicly 
available, would be an efficient way in which to 
facilitate this. There is extensive research highlighting 
the benefits of stakeholder participation in decision-
making processes. It can provide decision-makers 
with information that might otherwise be unavailable 
and can help to build public support for decisions (for 
example, see Steele, 2001).
ii) Accountability
Parliament should, therefore, be involved in the SIA 
process so that it can hold the negotiators, i.e. the 
Government, to account as it develops and exercises 
the UK’s new trade policy. Trade negotiations will often 
involve potentially controversial trade-offs between 
equally legitimate policy goals and the Government 
must be made to publicly account for these.
Parliamentary committees should be established 
to oversee the SIA process. Consultants should be 
required to go before the committee at key points 
in the process, equivalent to the three stages in 
the EU SIA process, to explain their methodologies 
and findings. Equally, negotiators should go before 
the committee to outline how the SIA’s findings 
are being used in the negotiations. At the end of 
the negotiations, the Government should publish 
a position paper similar to that prepared by the 
Commission. Again, a minister should be required to 
go before a committee to explain how the results of 
Figure 1: The three main stages of the EU’s SIA process
the SIA and stakeholder feedback have been taken 
into account.  This will enhance the influence that 
SIA has on the trade negotiations as the Government 
would have to defend decisions they make before 
Parliament.
Given that the UK intends to agree a large number 
of trade agreements in a short period of time, 
consideration should be given to establishing different 
committees to oversee individual SIAs. In the future, 
when the political and economic imperative for rapidly 
adopting large numbers of trade agreements in a short 
period of time is reduced, this work could be taken on 
by the ITC.
These measures should be separate from Parliament’s 
role in ratifying any new trade agreement. The 
proposals here are intended to enhance transparency 
and accountability within the SIA process by requiring 
the Government to show how it has responded to 
specific concerns that may become lost in wider 
parliamentary consideration of the merits of the final 
trade agreement.
Finally, the role of the judiciary in the SIA process 
should be clearly defined. If rights of participation 
are being created, either for formal stakeholders, 
the wider public or both, there must be an effective 
means of recourse if these rights are violated. Due to 
the issues relating to standing, time and costs (Bell 
and McGillivray et al, 2017, 331-349), establishing a 
• A baseline scenario is developed to enable comparisons with the predicted impacts of the 
proposed trade agreement.
• An initial screening and scoping exercise is conducted to identify the trade measures being 
negotiated that are likely to have particular impacts and the sectors that will require detailed 
analysis.
• An inception report is produced that sets out the proposed SIA methodology and consultation 
plan, including a list of key stakeholders.
• Consultants conduct various environmental, economic, social and human rights analyses of 
the proposed trade agreement, based on the information provided by the Commission and the 
results of their consultations during the inception phase.
• Those sectors identified in the inception phase as particularly relevant are subject to more 
detailed analysis. The specific targets of this analysis may change as the agreement evolves and 
in response to consultations.
• An interim report is produced based on the results of the analysis and stakeholder feedback.
• Results set out in the interim report are refined following further analysis and consultation.
• This is essentially a summary document in which results, methodologies and feedback are set 
out clearly and concisely, with information about how each has been used in the SIA.
• The final report must contain recommendations to enhance mitigate potential impacts, with 
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absence of EU Membership. In particular, ‘deep’ trade 
agreements might provide for increased alignment 
in the regulatory process, the content of regulations 
and standards and/or the process of verification of 
regulatory compliance. Of most immediate relevance 
is the prospect of a UK-US trade deal, for which 
President Trump and Prime Minister May have agreed 
to lay the groundwork (BBC, 2018). The US has long 
complained of the EU’s approach to food safety, which 
has led to bans on a number of US exports, including 
some food additives, meat treated with hormones 
and beta antagonists, meat washed with pathogen 
reduction treatments (for example, ‘chlorinated 
chicken’) and tallow. The US has also expressed 
concern about the EU’s increasingly cautious approach 
to endocrine-disrupting pesticides and slow approval 
process for genetically modified organisms (US Trade 
Representative, 2017, pp 147-156). 
These regulatory barriers stem from the EU’s 
application of the precautionary principle, which 
provides a lower threshold than the US for banning or 
limiting new products on the basis that they are likely 
to be hazardous, even when scientific data do not 
allow for full risk assessment (European Commission, 
2000). The US complaints referenced above make 
clear that it would exert pressure on the UK to 
remove product bans and adopt risk assessment that 
conforms more closely with the US approach. To some 
extent, the UK will have to choose whether to maintain 
harmonised standards with the EU or re-negotiate 
these with US (or other third country) markets in 
mind. This, in turn, will help determine whether the UK 
maintains the status quo with respect to its product-
related environmental and consumer protection 
standards or adopts an approach that the EU would 
consider constitutes a lower level of protection.4 
This decision may well be binary. The approach by which 
the UK will maintain regulatory alignment with the EU is 
a key remaining area of disagreement. The EU has ruled 
out regulatory alignment on a sectoral basis that would 
allow for future divergence (see Institute for Government, 
2018). If it maintains this position, as Magntorn and 
Winters (2018) have argued, the implication for the UK 
is that it must either adopt a trade agreement close to 
Norway’s, with Single Market membership and near full 
regulatory alignment, or close to Canada’s, which has 
little regulatory harmonisation at all.
4  These differences can be made explicit even in trade 
agreements that do not succeed in harmonizing the specific sectoral 
regulations in question. CETA lists the precautionary principle as 
an accepted justification for regulation to protect workers or the 
environment (Articles 23.3.3, 24.8.2). In contrast, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership regulatory coherence chapter, which the US effectively 
developed before withdrawing from the Agreement, affirms that 
partners should base regulation on scientific information (TPP Article 
25.5 (2)d).
through the dispute settlement mechanism, if a Party 
complains that they have been violated, a Panel is 
provided in order to find a ‘mutually satisfactory plan’ 
(CETA, Articles 23.10.12 and 24.15.11). Other trade 
agreements, such as EU-South Korea, take a similar 
approach. 
To implement these chapters, the UK must replicate 
these bodies and functions. The UK may wish to take 
a different approach to trade agreements that does 
not provide such a strong emphasis on human rights 
or that provides more enforceability for labour and 
environmental obligations (Harrison et al., 2017). 
However, if it seeks to roll-over existing agreements, 
it will de facto adopt EU external policy priorities 
embodied in these trade agreements, which it must 
imminently make operational. 
B) Regulatory harmonization and ‘deep’ trade 
agreements2
The majority of UK environmental regulation derives 
from EU law. The UK will leave the EU with a high 
degree of harmonisation, having transposed the 
EU acquis into domestic law.3  Arguably the most 
important issue regarding the UK’s future trade and 
sustainable development strategy is the extent to 
which it will maintain this regulatory alignment. The 
UK government has repeatedly reassured the public, 
as well as EU negotiating partners, that it will uphold 
as high levels of environmental and worker protection 
as those found in the EU. Prime Minister May further 
elaborated in March 2018 that ‘The UK will need 
to make a strong commitment that its regulatory 
standards will remain as high as the EU’s. That 
commitment, in practice, will mean that UK and EU 
regulatory standards will remain substantially similar 
in the future.’ (HM Government, 2018b) 
Leaving the Customs Union will give the UK freedom 
to conclude FTAs independent of the EU. Trade 
agreements provide a motive for regulatory reforms 
in order to pursue more ‘frictionless trade’ in the 
2, Here we focus solely on the regulation on human, animal and 
plant life and health, or Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures; there 
are many additional areas of EU regulation we do not consider. For 
a useful discussion of UK labour standards and its future trade 
agreements see Harrison et al., 2017. 
3, Parallel to the rollover of EU trade agreements, the transposing of 
EU environmental law and regulation will not provide an automatic 
transition. EU agencies, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
and the European Commission all play a key role in the development, 
review and enforcement of environmental standards and regulations. 
Key to the UK’s maintenance of high levels of domestic environmental 
protection will be its ability to provide similarly robust domestic 
enforcement mechanisms and replicate the scientific and technical 
expertise embodied in EU agencies. See, for example, Client Earth 
(2017).
specific statutory right of appeal or other expeditious 




DEVELOPMENT THROUGH TRADE 
AGREEMENTS
A) Approaches to sustainable trade through trade 
agreements
The UK should develop independent objectives for 
integrating sustainable development into its trade 
agreements. However, through the roll-over of EU 
trade agreements, it will de facto inherit the EU 
approach. Whilst this approach differs from agreement 
to agreement, it contains cross-cutting and distinct 
features. Most notably, EU FTAs are normally made 
conditional on trade partners upholding human rights 
and democratic principles. In contrast, commitments 
to uphold labour and environmental standards 
are often characterized as ‘soft’ or ‘cooperative’ 
– countries have no recourse to formal dispute 
settlement mechanisms, and they function through the 
FTA’s establishment of monitoring bodies (see Bartels, 
2013). 
This has significant implications for the UK. First, 
UK external trade will enshrine human rights as a 
pre-eminent FTA objective, with scope for the UK to 
unilaterally withdraw benefits of the Agreement on 
the basis of violations of human rights or democratic 
process. Second, in the actual implementation of 
rolled-over agreements, the environmental and labour 
standards chapters will entail specific practical 
challenges. In this respect, the roll-over of EU trade 
agreements is not ‘automatic’. For example, the 
CETA Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement 
between Canada and the EU (CETA) establishes a 
Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development 
(CTSD) of high-level officials from both countries 
who monitor the implementation of CETA provisions 
on labour and environmental protection, including 
through holding public sessions. A Civil Society Forum 
promotes dialogue on the sustainable development 
elements of CETA and receives reports from the 
CTSD. CETA also establishes Domestic Advisory 
Groups (DAGs) of NGO, academic, business and trade 
union representatives. The European Economic and 
Social Committee provides a Secretariat for DAGs 
that the EU has established for this and other trade 
agreements (CETA, Articles 22.4.3, 23.8.3, 24.13.3; 
see also European Parliament, 2017).  Finally, while 
sustainable development chapters are not enforceable 
CONCLUSION
In this Briefing Paper, we argue that the UK should approach sustainable development objectives as integral to 
its trade policy, through procedural and substantive dimensions. With respect to the former, the Government has 
identified the involvement of certain actors as important to ‘transparent and inclusive trade’, notably Parliament, 
devolved regions, businesses and civil society (HM Government, 2017), but there are a number of gaps in 
formalising their involvement. Redressing these will lead to better-informed and indeed more successful trade 
policy. A recent analysis by Henig underscores this point. He identifies elements that enable successful FTA 
negotiations; these include ensuring that agreements take account of a wide array of different interests, and provide 
for transparency and consultation (Henig, 2018, pp 10-12). The Government should not be complacent about public 
support for FTAs, and ensure, to the extent possible, that governance of its external trade does not deepen domestic 
divides.
With respect to the substantive commitments made through FTAs, liberalising UK trade should not lead to the 
weakening of UK objectives in other areas, such as environmental and consumer protection and high labour 
standards. The Government has committed to upholding its current levels of standards and protections through 
the Brexit process (HM Government, 2018b). Integrating this objective into its future trade agreements will simply 
ensure that it is able to uphold and operationalize this commitment. 
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FURTHER INFORMATION
The UK Trade Policy observatory (UKTPO), a 
partnership between the University of Sussex and 
Chatham House, is an independent expert group that: 
1) initiates, comments on and analyses trade policy 
proposals for the UK; and 
2) trains British policy makers, negotiators and other 
interested parties through tailored training packages. 
The UKTPO is committed to engaging with a wide 
variety of stakeholders to ensure that the UK’s 
international trading environment is reconstructed 
in a manner that benefits all in Britain and is fair 
to Britain, the EU and the world. The Observatory 
offers a wide range of expertise and services to 
help support government departments, international 
organisations and businesses to strategise and 
develop new trade policies in the post-Brexit era.
For further information on this theme or the work of 
the UK Trade Observatory, please contact:
Professor L Alan Winters 
Director 
UK Trade Policy Observatory
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